A REPOSITORY OF POSSIBILITY AND FREEDOM: READING ARJUNA'S EXISTENTIAL CRISIS THROUGH KIERKEGAARD'S *CONCEPT OF ANXIETY*

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ABSTRACT

Kierkegaard's formulations upon anxiety and freedom have profoundly shaped the thought of such existentialist thinkers as Sartre, and Camus, especially their notions of angst and despair. But while these latter writers came to see anxiety as something negative, Kierkegaard had a more positive understanding. It is the gift of possibilities, and a crucial stage of transition or suspension before action or non-action is performed. Kierkegaard called this transitional state a 'dreaming state' or a suspension before action or non-action. This essay will show how the Bhagavad Gita in the Indian tradition illustrates this idea. The existentially anxious Arjuna, epitomizes this state in his dialectical engagement with Kṛṣṇa, and Arjuna's anxiety can be seen to be ontologically liberating rather than debilitating as it is sometimes understood in the later existentialist tradition.

Keywords: Anxiety; Arjuna; Bhagavad Gita; Existentialism; Kierkegaard

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Kierkegaard on Anxiety

Amongst the many problems of modern subjectivity, anxiety is indisputably a fundamentally recurring one. The contemporary world provides us with more and more situations that demand choices, and yet provides less and less meaning which would guide those choices. As anxiety has become increasingly prevalent, it has been extensively written about, particularly in the fields of psychiatry, psychology, and neuroscience. Although these vantage points are helpful in the sense that they provide diverse perspectives on this subject, they all assume that individuals are one with their anxiety, that is to say, these discourses regard anxiety to be a negative or pathological "condition" which originates internally and therein makes it difficult if not impossible to achieve any distance from one's unsettled state. The nineteenth-century Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard views anxiety quite differently: for him, it marks not so much a disability, as an awareness of our freedom to act or not act in the world.

Kierkegaard's thought on modern "angst" of course influenced many thinkers in the twentieth-century West, especially the existentialists like Sartre and Camus. In general, their work tended – mistakenly I believe – to view anxiety as nihilistic and debilitating. But I believe that Kierkegaard sees anxiety as something inherently positive – the gift of possibilities – a stage of transition or suspension before action or non-action is performed. In order to make these ideas and connections clearer, let me first clarify Kierkegaard's notion of anxiety as a 'state of being', however temporary and "unreal."

As its title indicates, Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety,* first published in 1844, sets forth his principal approach to the subject. His argument is informed by the presupposition that anxiousness is central to human experience, and it proceeds from an ontological rather than empirical source. Unlike the sciences of psychology and psychiatry, Kierkegaard's method is to integrate rather than to dissect. What this means is that unlike a psychological approach to this subject, which would strive to go deeper into unconscious issues, Kierkegaard's analysis

of anxiety does not attempt to delineate between body and mind. For him anxiety is not secondary to experience, but is rather integrated with existence. Hence, anxiety is not generated by an empirical object in Kierkegaard's understanding, it originates in what he calls the "dreaming state," characterized by its ethereal, disconcerting quality. Essentially then, Kierkegaard's view on anxiety is radical in the sense that it does not equate the empirical individual and anxiety in the strictest sense. It reserves a different status for it within the domain of existence, set forth at the outset of *The Concept of Anxiety*.

> Anxiety is a qualification of the dreaming spirit, and as such it has its place in psychology. Awake, the difference between myself and my other is posited; sleeping, it is suspended dreaming; it is an *intimidated nothing.* The actuality of the spirit constantly shows itself as a form that tempts its possibility but disappears as soon as it seeks to grasp for it, and it is a *nothing* that can only bring anxiety.[2]

This intriguing notion of a dreaming state or what Kierkegaard also calls the "innocent state" prepares the way for his conceptualization of ontological anxiety: this is the location for the origination of anxiety, emanating from the self. However, this self is not mind or body for Kierkegaard, it is a more integrative sphere, i.e. the spirit. This stage is characterized in his thought by two underlying principles, transcendentality and passivity. It is transcendental because it exists beyond the binary frameworks of good or evil, positive or negative. At this nascent stage, then, anxiety is not attached to morality since the individual is ignorant of its origin. It would not be incorrect to infer that this is a position of innocence or even indifference because "nothing" tangible actually exists that could generate anxiousness. Kierkegaard appropriately associates this inner state of being with the principles of "peace" and "repose." Because there is no incident or external object that could lead to anxiety, there is "nothing" to strive against.

At this juncture, anxiety appears to be detached from any possibility, paradoxically because it has not fixated on any one of those, but rather perceives them in the form of the infinite. This nothingness does not imply non-existence of possibilities, on the contrary it is based upon endless possibilities. It is therefore a liberating state, as Kierkegaard would argue, because the individual has not yet taken action or decided against acting. As he writes, "Anxiety is freedom's actuality as the possibility of possibility".[3] Once one decides upon any of the choices presented from the infinite realm, it would mean rejecting other alternatives and thereby compromising his or her existential agency. It is important to point out here that this stage is seen as innocent primarily due to its neutrality. Consciousness encounters an array of choices but they exist similarly to the individual's being as possibility. This state, then, "begets anxiety." Kierkegaard insists that this state is in fact not something negative but quite the opposite, it is to some extent a marker of higher intelligence arising out of the self. It is not a limitation, but an outcome of the realization of human limitation and mortality.

To grasp Kierkegaard's concept of ontological angst, it becomes crucial to assess what he means by "possibility." As noted above, anxiety for Kierkegaard is intimately tied with the awareness of infinite possibilities. But why does he conceive of these options as fundamental in human existence? A short answer would be that they symbolize freedom and free will. In "Kierkegaard: The Self and Ethical Existence," George J. Stack offers a detailed account of what Kierkegaardian possibilities imply. Stack divides them into two broad categories: Concrete or Conceptual and Abstract or Imagined. The first belongs to the empirical domain, in the sense that it has a definite object or situation to be actualized. In a way, this would be closer to the rational domain within the limits of the individual. The consequences of this possibility would be easily categorized into moral frameworks. Kierkegaard gives the example of Adam in the Garden: this first human is aware that the act of eating from the tree of knowledge would lead to a punishment of some kind. At this level, the act of eating the forbidden fruit will certainly bring about shame

and guilt. This category of possibility thus lacks complexity as both the chosen action and the aftermath (punishment) are already imagined. Hence, herein there exists limited scope for freedom.

By contrast, what Stack calls abstract or imagined possibility belongs to the aesthetic stage and represents for Kierkegaard a complex ideal. In this case, prospects are imagined to be unlimited, without fixating on or choosing them. Here, possibilities are not tied to experience or memory. That is to say, the individual can believe in a possibility that has never been actualized before. To imagine varied and rich alternatives is extremely liberating. Angst experienced at this moment would be of greater magnitude solely because consciousness entails a "reflective indecision" which precludes morality. The engagement is objective, at least that is how Kierkegaard would see it, since the association with any one choice has not been made yet. As Stack observes, "What Kierkegaard seems to mean, then, is that freedom is possible only in a world in which an individual can imagine (or think about) possibilities and has the capacity to act upon those possibilities or to actualize some of those possibilities."[4]

While offering these insights into the repository of human possibilities and their potentiality, Kierkegaard assumes the role of a kind of witness and not a preacher. In "The Oracle's Ambiguity: Freedom and Original Sin in Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*," Vanessa Rumble points out that in his book Kierkegaard adopts the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis, which literally translates into "the watchman," the one keeping watch. Employment of this pseudonym mirrors the author's deliberately opaque philosophy. Rumble argues that rather than associating himself with any one possibility or the process and aftermath of their actualization, Kierkegaard maintains an objective distance by being the "one who deals with possibility rather than actuality." [5] Given the objective distance that Kierkegaard maintains throughout the narrative, his ideals about freedom and anxiety become clearer. He is trying to suggest that he occupies a state both unaware and ignorant of the spirit or the self, in other words, a state synchronous with innocence or the dreaming subjectivity. In Rumble's terms, he forgoes a "determinate conception of

the self or freedom."[6] Thus, in this scenario, only a distant objectivity is possible, in some sense, the position of witness. Rumble concludes, "In this state, prior to the actual exercise of freedom, and prior to concrete consciousness of responsibility of Sin, opacity characterizes anxiety's appearance: the subject of freedom—the Self or the Spirit—is unknown to itself, the actual possibilities which face the individual are obscure, and moral categories are not yet posited."[7]

Arjuna's anxiety

In popular culture, anxiety, by virtue of being interpreted as fear, is regarded as a weakness. Kierkegaard's analysis is radical primarily because it reads anxiety as a response to human freedom and possibility. Again, paradoxically, the "nothingness" that gives rise to anxiety is the being conscious of the "possibility of possibility." However, when read without specific examples Kierkegaard's ideas in this regard appear confusing, readily misinterpreted. To offer a helpful and most unusual example, I will now take up Kierkegaard's ideas on anxiety, possibility, and freedom in relation to the warrior Arjuna's dilemma in the Hindu epic *Mahabharata* (third-century, BCE): Arjuna's "innocent stage"—his deliberations—specifically take place in the *Mahabharata*'s *Bhagavad Gita,* wherein Krishna, like some early form of Kierkegaard, dialectically witnesses Arjuna's reflection on possibilities.

The *Mahabharata* narrates a decisive battle over royal succession among an extended family: the Pandavas having been exiled for thirteen years after losing a game of chance with their cousins, the Kauravas. The inevitable conflict is to restore the moral code, i.e., the "rightful" possession for the Pandavas. The *Bhagavad Gita*, reflecting at-length upon various kinds of wisdom, addresses a key episode in the battle for succession: the Pandavas warrior Arjuna's internal struggle regarding fighting against his kinsmen and his dialogue with his charioteer, god Kṛṣṇa. Since tradition has viewed the ślokas of the *Gita* as primarily as a religio-spiritual text, it has generally overlooked Arjuna's conflict as philosophical in a humanistic existential manner. It is urged that

the only reason for Arjuna's hesitancy to act at this point is a moral or familial dilemma, that is to say, he cannot kill his family. Thus Kṛṣṇa's intervention has been thus justified for centuries, both as a godly figure and as a moral guide. But this has taken away from the fact that Arjuna, apart from being caught up in moral duty, is a thinking and existing being who has a keenly developed consciousness.

Concentrating on that consciousness, I want to read Arjuna's profound apprehension through Kierkegaard's concept of anxiety. Of course the moral and familial obligations are quite clear for Arjuna at this point. The anticipation of the war ordinarily would have been an easy one for him, and, moreover, as a *kshatriya*, he is trained to fight and protect. What then is the deeper nature of the internal conflict that makes him take a step back and reflect? If he is ostensibly fighting a just and fair fight that must be won in order to restore the good, he should have been unquestionably able to act. I would argue that Arjuna's dilemma is much more complex than being solely a moral one that necessitates fighting his extended family. The *Gita* tries to fit Arjuna's subjectivity and existential pause into a framework that is less complicated, and it does so for two reasons.

First, it is a Brahmanical text that seeks to impart an appropriate knowledge easily comprehensible by the general populace. The dominant caste regimes at that time would not have appreciated complexities and unanswered questions that left scope for a different kind of interpretation. Secondly, the *Gita* needed to justify the theory of *niṣkāmakarma* (acting without expecting), through a godly figure like Kṛṣṇa. It is suggested that the human being, even one as strong as Arjuna, is fallible and incapable of relying on his free will. This did not diminish Arjuna's presence in the epic so much as it justified Kṛṣṇa's presence and role. Crucially, however, it led to an overshadowing of the existential conflict that was haunting Arjuna's consciousness at this point.

Although the *Gita* does promote certain kinds of philosophy that will be discussed in the following paragraphs, it leaves scope for interpreting this incident from different vantage points that are not solely

limited to the traditional ones. In fact, the *Gita* in some senses is a radical work because it allows its hero to be vulnerable, skeptical, and indecisive. Generally, this would be something that the epic format would disdain. Even though we see a warrior's questioning of the purpose of war and its ultimate futility in other epics, for example, in Homer's *Iliad,* the *Gita* astonishingly devotes eighteen chapters to this internal conflict and questioning. Moreover, the *Gita* depicts, at least initially, the warrior champion Arjuna as first and above all an existent human being.

This makes Arjuna pertinent to our understanding of Existentialism. In his introduction to *The Existentialists*, Charles Guignon puts it succinctly: "existentialism addresses questions that arise for individuals in the course of actually living out their lives."[8] It is important to point out here that Guignon's emphasis is on the nature of existence, everything that is external and ultimately ontological follows from that state. The individual first exists as a being and develops as Kierkegaard would argue the feeling of belonging to and with others, the real. This is another central aspect of being and existence that strongly contributes to awareness of one's identity. In my reading, the Gita actually does the same, aiming to provide knowledge about the self and thus ontology.

Arjuna's conflicted being exists in its purest form at the beginning of the *Gita.* As he enters the battlefield of Kurukshetra, he is seated in a chariot with a flag that is marked with Hanuman. Ironically, Hanuman is the god in Hinduism who represents pure physical strength and courage. Everything is ready at this point for the final action or climax, as up until this moment everything (the gods and different characters) have been preparing for the decisive war. At the initial stage Arjuna wants to witness the battlefield and his family members engaged in violence. He asks Kṛṣṇa to draw the chariot closer to the "two armies so that I may see those present."[9] As the battle rages this moment proves too intense for Arjuna's consciousness to bear: the scene is beyond any rationale: it is merciless and futile violence.

It is unreal for him and causes a sort of dizziness in a Kierkegaardian sense, as realization of freedom creates a kind of vertigo. This is because

he is free to act or not act based on his free will, before of course Kṛṣṇa's arrival. As an existential being, Arjuna prioritizes empirical evidence. He can be seen as belonging to both the empirical and the absolute stage that Stack's essay talked about. He is fixated on the possibilities that lie ahead of him and the damage that he and the others will cause to the world and people around him. Yet, at the same time his understanding of freedom is in the absolute sense. We know this because one of the reasons for his anxious state is the realization that his freedom can be curtailed. It would not be wrong therefore to say that Arjuna belongs to both the empirical and aesthetic Kierkegaardian realms.

At this point, Arjuna stands at a distance from the actual battle as he assesses his role. This is a state of suspension. There is the moment of "peace" and "repose" that Kierkegaardian ontological anxiety entails. It is a neutral stage that preludes the moral associations with good or evil. As Arjuna is one with existence here, he is inseparable with his anxiety. Furthermore, he is both the observer, as Vigilius Haufniensis in *Concept of Anxiety,* and the one experiencing this alien feeling. The *Gita*'s extrapolation on this *shloka* makes this explicit: "he was very anxious to see who the leading persons present on the battlefield were. Although there was no question of a peacemaking endeavor on the battlefield, he wanted to see them again, and how much they were bent upon demanding an unwanted war."[10]

The anxiety that Arjuna experiences here is based on "nothing," primarily because he has not participated in action or decided against it yet. He questions the reality of this battle as he occupies the "innocent" or "ignorant" state. There is no clear delineation between possibility and actuality, it is the "dreaming state." For Kierkegaard, anxiety emerges out of a non-reality, which implies that only possibilities exist in such a vacuum, unless and until the subjective "I" consciously decides to act or not act. It is important to note here that Arjuna is undisturbed by external influences, primarily that of Kṛṣṇa. Arjuna alone is in this intense experience that he probably could not explain. This is before Kṛṣṇa tactically persuades him to take action and play his role.

The *Gita* never suggests that this is fear or dread, as would be Kierkegaard's analysis here, since the object is not definite. There is no one enemy or friend that Arjuna imagines, it exists in the form of possibilities in front of him. Being a Ksatirya, fear would be something that Arjuna would be expected to surpass easily. Even if this was purely fear or hesitancy of a lesser magnitude that had nothing to do with ontology, action would have eventually come to Arjuna. The pause here is more profound than these emotions. This pause is inherently existential because what Arjuna is seeking is conscious action, his active role in the events of his life even if the greater part of that life is beyond his control. The anxiety in him can thus be seen as enabling a decision that would be more aware, although there is no guarantee whatsoever of consciously remaining guilt-free.

Moreover, just as anxiety's relationship to its object is "ambiguous," Arjuna is unsure of the source of his feelings. As the external factors that have caused this anxiety continue to be unclear, he cannot be certain of empirical explanation or location of them. Kierkegaard would call this the spirit stage that Arjuna finds himself in, defined as the "synthesis between the physical and psychological."[11] The spirit relates itself to anxiety; it is a position that transcends both these realms for Kierkegaard. A similar anxiety is experienced by Adam, who is instructed not to eat from the tree of knowledge. Forbiddance awakens desire in Adam, as this is essentially a denial of agency or in existential terms the will to assert himself in the face of anxiety. Similar to Arjuna's position, Adam is unaware of either good or bad before acting or not acting, hence he pre-exists that experience. The grip of the existential conflict is stronger therein.

All that exists are possibilities that could be actualized. Hence, this is the "innocent" stage wherein the subjectivity is perplexed but not guilty. What is central however to both Adam and Arjuna's situation is that both of them are aware of freedom, the possibility of action and non-action. Kierkegaard concludes that "Adam must have had a knowledge of freedom, because the desire was to use it."[12] Interestingly, although the transition from innocence to guilt has not yet taken place, anxiety arises as

one already imagines innocence to be lost. This makes the claim stronger that this anxiety cannot be confined to tangible or obvious sources. Like Adam, Arjuna does not belong to either the empirical or the aesthetic world, which would be definite in their own ways: the anxiousness arises from the unknown, the transcendental sphere.

This complexity is witnessed when Arjuna enters the battlefield and is unable to shoot arrows at his family. In his case, the necessity to act induces anxiety. To not act would be against the *Dharma*, or the assigned duty for him. However, unlike Adam's case, we see in the *Gita* Arjuna's radical questioning of what is expected of him and the issue of morality. As the latter is subjective, so is knowledge, and anxiety in both these cases emerges from the realization of human action's limitation. Choosing one possibility would entail letting go of the other, and this choice is difficult since it is not solely determined by the individual. More than being archetypes of certain types of morality, both Adam and Arjuna are struggling human figures first. This existence is not historical as much as it is in our imaginations. Arjuna, despite being associated with unquestioned chivalry and warrior traits is described in the most human form in the *Gita*: "My dear Krishna, seeing my friends and relatives present before me in such a fighting spirit, I feel the limbs of my body quivering and my mouth drying up."[13]

What is fascinating here is the kind of description: Arjuna is as vulnerable as any human being would be in this situation. This is not simply a weakness. Rather, similar to existential anxiety, indicates Arjuna's spiritual strength. As he rejects the need for possession or the social rewards that will come with victory, Arjuna has transcended the psychological and philosophical realms of being. Therefore the experience he is confronted with cannot belong to these, but the domain of the spirit. In the context of the argument here, the spirit would mean something that witnesses (Vigilius), possibilities in a reflective state; it resists embracing the material or the moral world, even though it eventually has to enter those.

But imagine Arjuna standing on the battlefield, renouncing any decision. This is precisely because the spirit has no inherent motivation after the material and religious are denied. For Arjuna, acting on the obvious possibility here would have come easily if the motivation came from the outside figures or things. The anxiety, that is the marker of his intelligence, is a product of not aligning himself with the available possibilities as they do not fulfill his spirit or soul. We hear him actually saying this in the *Gita* in explicit terms: "I do not see how any good can come from killing my own kinsmen in this battle, nor can I, my dear Kṛṣṇa, desire any subsequent victory, kingdom or happiness."[14]

The *Gita* oversimplifies Arjuna's anxiety and its manifestations as being caused by the fear of death or losing the mortal self. Hence, the entire narrative that follows tries to persuade Arjuna about the after-life or existence beyond this life. It is in this regard that the doctrine of non-attachment is provided through the figure of Kṛṣṇa. He advises that if there is no attachment via ego or with the action's consequences the individual can attain *Moksha*. However, Arjuna's concern, as an existentialist figure, remains centered on the reality that he is presented with. He strives to exert himself, like Camus's Sisyphus in the present moment even if it allows him limited agency. The anxiety experienced by Arjuna is thus about action: the reality of his existential situation leads him to raise questions about his fate and autonomy.

In "The Issue of Determinism and Freedom as an Existential Question: A Case in the *Bhagavad Gita*," Duck-Joo Kwak and Hye-Chong Han consider Arjuna's dilemma as fundamentally epistemological and existential. They argue that the *Gita* is in fact "an exemplary text in which an existential perspective is manifested."[15] In other words, the *Gita* captures this philosophical crisis between necessity to assert one's self and at the same time realizing its limitation or the role of predetermination. Put another way, is there any point in exercising agency (if one ever fully has it), when most of our lives lie beyond our control. That is what Arjuna's frustration is trying to convey to Kṛṣṇa at a fundamental level. This is the rhetorical question that bedevils Arjuna's mind as he cannot

completely let go of the idea of freedom. And freedom here entails a complex connotation. As Kwak and Han observe, freedom is resident not only in the action or its postponement—what exhibits freedom is something more nuanced rather than absolute, freedom arises when: "the agent is supposed to be capable of being rational in deliberating among alternatives and making a decision about his or her action."[16]

Thus Arjuna's freedom does not lie in the final decision to participate in the war or not, but rather in the very fact that he pauses to reflect, experiences anxiety in this state, and articulates it without repression. In this episode, we see the peerless warrior Arjuna existing as a human being. The *Gita* captures this beauty of human fragility: "I am now unable to stand here any longer. I am forgetting myself and my mind is reeling. I see only causes of misfortune."[17]

Despite hearing Kṛṣṇa's persuasive argument regarding the necessity of action and its leading to eventual good for the afterlives of all, Arjuna remains fixated on immediate reality. If he were to think only about the births and their endless connection with good instead of bad karma, Arjuna would evade the real and present moment that grips his consciousness.

In their reading of the *Gita,* Kwak and Han describe this as a moment of transcendent disillusionment for Arjuna, one wherein from an assumed objective position he meditates on the meaning of it all. Most importantly, after reflecting upon his ontological dilemma, Arjuna's first impulse is to reject the action which is necessary here, since the question for him is not one of moral righteousness or obligatory duties but of "how he should live." This explains why the *Gita,* through Kṛṣṇa's presence, must give insights into the subject of self-knowledge: affirming the question: who is Arjuna as an individual or self, outside of all predetermined characterizations and the stated moral duty?

We know that the *Gita* raises this question even though it later gets subsumed under what is "right" from a cultural standpoint. Within his developing philosophical perception, Arjuna resists the allure of both *dharma* (duty towards society and family) and non-attached (egoless)

action or *Karma.* Arjuna's story tells us to some extent that action, even when justified and sanctioned by moral codes, is not necessarily asserting the self. One might imagine that agency simply means acting on possibilities, but here we see a unique case of pure existence, as it meditates objectively on the futility of action. Arjuna's courage is usually understood in terms of physicality and his skills, and he is represented as standing with folded hands as he receives "knowledge" from Kṛṣṇa. However, traditional interpreters of the *Gita* tend to overlook and even repress Arjuna's existential angst because of its magnitude: the *Gita* is to convey answers, but there can never be absolute answers to the existential questions concerning ultimate action, predetermination, and freedom.

Above all, what we can learn from, or at least appreciate about, Arjuna's spiritual courage is that he is cognizant of the freedom to not act. As that awareness can also be a way of asserting the "I" or subjectivity, of course his reflective anxiety goes deeper and questions the very nature of the self. We know that he eventually acted and fought in the war. But would he have taken such martial action had there been no external influence from Kṛṣṇa? More significantly, would he still be considered as heroic as he is today if he had affirmed only his existential autonomy? These concerns are not limited to Arjuna's consciousness or his extraordinary situation but have a bearing on the modern individual's existence and his or her numberless (and numbing) possibilities. With both Arjuna's anxious existential reflections and Kierkegaard's concept of anxiety in mind, can we modern subjects be similarly reflective before entering the battle for authentic existence? Kierkegaard felt assured that existential anxiety is a marker of genius and intelligence of a certain kind, and promised a way forward.

ENDNOTES

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[5] Rumble, Vanessa. "The Oracle's Ambiguity: Freedom and Original Sin in Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*." 75 (1992): 612.

[6] Ibid, 614.

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[8] Guignon, Charles. The Existentialists: Critical Essays on Kierkegaard, Nietzche, Heideggar and Sartre. (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 1.

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[14] Ibid, 35.

[15] Kwak, Duck-Joo and Hye-Chong Han. "The Issue of Determinism and Freedom as an Existential Question: A Case in the *Bhagavad Gita*." (*Philosophy East and West*. 63, 2010), 54.

[16] Ibid, 54.

[17] Prabhupada, S. Bhaktivedanta. *Bhagavad Gita as It Is*. (Intermex Publishing 2006), 1.31, 53).

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